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Cicero and St. Augustine’s Just War Theory: Classical Influences on a Christian Idea
Berit Van Neste
ABSTRACT
The theology of Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, and the origin of his theory of
Just War are subjects of serious scholarly debate. Just War involved the use of the state
army to eliminate heresy by killing heretics who refused to convert to mainstream
Christianity. The purpose of this paper is to argue that Augustine primarily based his
theory of Just War on Cicero’s own theory of Just War.
Augustine was quite heavily influenced by Cicero. He credited Cicero with his
own conversion to Christianity. He drew heavily from Cicero’s works as a basis for
many of his own writings, such as City of God. He did, however, interpret Cicero’s works
to fit into his own theology, thereby changing the meanings of these works significantly.
Cicero was adapted to fit into Augustine’s Christian and Neoplatonic mold.
Cicero wrote a work called The Republic, which was lost for centuries. The only
way any of this work survived during that time was through quotations by writers, and
Augustine is one of the main sources for Cicero’s Republic. In The Republic, Cicero
creates the model state and argues that this state had the right to use military action on a
group of people who were not capable of exercising justice. This influenced Augustine to
develop his own theory of the perfect state, which also had this right to use military
action.
Several factors influenced the development of Augustine’s Just War theory. However,
none of them had the impact that Cicero’s theory of Just War did. Everything was fitted
into it. Augustine assimilated the influences of the church-state alliance and his
Neoplatonic background into Cicero’s concepts for the perfect state and its use of Just
War. Thus, Cicero provided the framework within which Augustine operated.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Just War Theory has often been used to justify going to war, even in the
present day. Despite its modern usages, however, the Just War Theory was developed
thousands of years ago. The Just War Theory, as it appears in the Christian tradition,
allows a Christian state to go to war to defend itself and the faith or to right a wrong that
has been perpetrated against itself or the faith. It is often thought that St. Augustine was
the originator of the Just War Theory, but in reality it predates Christianity. St.
Augustine lived during the late classical period and, consequently, was a transitional
figure in the history of Christianity and the West in general. He bridged the gap between
the classical Christianity of Ancient Rome and the medieval Christianity of Western
Europe, and his theology reflected this intermediary position by combining a large
amount of classical thought with his Christian ideas to formulate a new way of thinking.
However, historians draw an artificial line in the middle of Augustine’s life, a line that
separates his classical heritage from the medieval future that he inspires. Generally, there
seems to be little consideration of Augustine as a transitional figure and less
consideration that his theology was likewise transitional in nature. Augustine’s
development of his Just War Theory effectively illustrates the transitional nature of his
theology. Augustine was a product of the classical world, and so was his Theory of Just
War. Augustine’s Theory of Just War is to a large extent based on Cicero’s own Theory
1

of Just War, which Augustine modified with his own political, philosophical and
theological ideas into a concept that was acceptable to him and his Christian outlook.
Past and current scholarship, in general, does not deal adequately with this
problem of the classical origins of Augustine’s Just War Theory. Charles Norris
Cochrane, for example, wrote Christianity and Classical Culture, the quintessential text
about the influence of classical thought on the development of Christian thought. He
addresses Augustine in it, and recognizes the classical origins of Augustine’s theology.
He even points out that Augustine is a transitional figure with a mode of thought that
reworks classical thought into something new. However, he does not specify exactly
how Augustine does this, since he does not give very specific details about the content or
origins of Augustine’s thought. Needless to say, Just War Theory and its origins are not
covered in this book.
Peter Brown is another scholar who did not recognize the classical influences on
Augustine’s Just War Theory. He wrote a biography of Augustine, entitled Augustine of
Hippo, that is considered by many to be the academic standard for biographies of
Augustine. In it, he highlights the importance of Cicero in Augustine’s life, and he notes
the influence of Cicero’s writings on Augustine’s theology. However, like Cochrane,
Brown does not indicate that Augustine’s Just War Theory was in any way impacted by
anything other than Augustine’s confrontations with heretical Christian sects.
Herbert A. Deane comes closer than most scholars to identifying the classical
roots of Augustine’s Just War Theory. He wrote The Political and Social Ideas of St.
Augustine, an essential book for researching Augustine’s political thought. He
recognizes the importance of Cicero in the development of Augustine’s political theory,
2

especially that of the state and its justification for going to war. However, there is no
connection made between Cicero and the religious coercion that is a crucial element in
Augustine’s Just War Theory. Deane rather indicates that the Christian Roman emperors,
who would impose sanctions against heretical groups, inspired Augustine to formulate
the religious coercion characteristic of his Theory of Just War, but he does not explore
the sources of Augustine’s Just War Theory any further than that. 1
Robert Markus wrote an essay entitled “St. Augustine’s Views on the Just War”
in The Church and War. It deals with Augustine’s Just War Theory as being the product
of his times, the late Roman Empire. Markus notes that, unlike almost all of Augustine’s
other ideas, Augustine’s attitude towards war remained basically the same throughout
Augustine’s life. 2 However, Markus does not address the origins of Augustine’s Just
War Theory.
Those scholars who do address the origins of Augustine’s Just War Theory often
fall into the trap of declaring it to be an almost entirely original thought on the part of
Augustine. Deane does so when he implies that Augustine got the idea for religious
coercion from the Christian emperors’ edicts punishing heretics. Certainly these edicts
were an influence on Augustine’s Just War Theory, but this explanation is too simplistic
to be the source of the theory, which involves the development of some sophisticated
philosophical themes. Rather than drawing from contemporary politics, Michel Spanneut
asserts that Augustine based his Just War Theory on the wars in the Old Testament, wars

1

Herbert A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine (New York: Columbia University Press,
1963), 215.
2
Robert A. Markus, “Saint Augustine’s views on the ‘Just War,’” in The Church and War (ed. W. J. Sheils;
London: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 4.
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in which the Israelites conquered the surrounding Canaanites with God’s approval. 3 This
is also too simple to be an adequate explanation of the origin of such a complex theory.
Robert Holmes calls Augustine “the father of just war thinking” in Christianity. 4 This
label ignores any prior influences, particularly Christian ones, such as Ambrose’s
thoughts about just war, which were primarily drawn from Cicero and Roman tradition
but included the idea of going to war to maintain the unity of the Christian church. 5
None of these explanations adequately accounts for the source of Augustine’s Just War
Theory, however, these three scholars represent the most prevalent attitude toward the
origin of Augustine’s Just War Theory. All three scholars assume that Augustine
originated the idea of the Just War.
Some scholars, however, do look beyond Augustine for the origin of his Just War
Theory. Lisa Sowle Cahill, for example, lists Roman practice, Plato, Cicero and the
Bible among Augustine’s influences in the development of his Just War Theory, but she
does not explain what specific impact of each of these elements had on his Just War
Theory. 6 Like Cahill, Douglas Bax seems to connect Augustine’s Just War Theory to
Cicero. He declares Augustine’s Just War Theory to be the first new theory since
Cicero’s Just War Theory. 7 While Bax does not explicitly link the two Just War
Theories, he seems to imply a connection between them, but he does not follow up on

3

Michel Spanneut, “Saint Augustin et la Violence,” in Historia (ed. Réal Tremblay and Dennis J. Billy;
Rome: Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae, 1991), 114.
4
Robert L. Holmes, “St. Augustine and the Just War Theory,” in The Augustinian Tradition (ed. Gareth B.
Matthews; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 323.
5
Louis J. Swift, “St. Ambrose on Violence and War,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American
Philological Association 101 (1970): 533-543, 533.
6
Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Nonresistance, Defense, Violence, and the Kingdom in Christian Tradition,”
Interpretation 38 (Oct 1984): 380-397, 382.
7
Douglas S. Bax, “From Constantine to Calvin: The Doctrine of the Just War,” in Theology and Violence
(ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1987), 155.
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this implication. Albert Marrin also recognizes the connection between Cicero’s thought
and Augustine’s Just War Theory. About Augustine, Marrin asserts, “Not the least of his
accomplishments was the synthesizing of Ciceronian and Christian ideas about war.” 8
He does not, however, explain precisely what concepts are involved in this synthesis of
ideas. All three of these scholars indicate that Augustine depended on Roman and
Christian influences in the formulation of the Just War Theory, and in particular, they
link his Just War Theory to Cicero. None of them, though, explains the exact relationship
between Cicero’s thought and Augustine’s Just War Theory. An examination of the
writings of Augustine, however, reveals much about the connection between Cicero’s
thought and Augustine’s Just War Theory, and it indicates that a strong link exists
between his Just War Theory and that of Cicero. Most scholars agree that Cicero had a
heavy influence on many areas of Augustine’s life, but they either do not recognize or
explain how his ideas provided the main substance of Augustine’s Just War Theory.
This study of the connection between Cicero’s Just War Theory and Augustine’s
Just War Theory will focus on Augustine’s and Cicero’s writings and use an historical
approach to their writings as well as a textual analysis of them. The sources will be
drawn primarily from the body of Augustine’s writings. De civitate Dei will provide the
bulk of the source material for Augustine’s Just War Theory, however several of his
letters, particularly Epistula CXXXVIII , and other writings illuminate some key points of
convergence between his Just War Theory and that of Cicero. This material will be
compared with Cicero’s De re publica and De legibus, his major political writings. They
contain Cicero’s entire Just War Theory and are frequently quoted or paraphrased by
8

Albert Marrin, ed., War and the Christian Conscience (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1971), 52.
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Augustine in his writings. This study will show that a comparison of the texts will reveal
Augustine’s heavy dependence on Cicero in the formulation of his own Just War Theory.
This dependence upon Cicero is manifested especially in the basic concepts
employed by Augustine in explaining his Just War Theory. Augustine bases his Just War
Theory on three concepts that constitute the basis of this study: justice, natural and
temporal law, and the commonwealth. Augustine’s Just War Theory rests heavily on his
definition of the commonwealth, and it allows the commonwealth to go to war for two
specific reasons. A commonwealth can go to war in order to right a wrong that has been
perpetrated against it by another state. It can also go to war to protect itself from
destruction. Justice is the foundation of the Just War Theory, and it provides the
justification of the two reasons for engaging in war. An examination of Augustine’s
concept of natural law and temporal law is also necessary to understand the conditions
under which a just war can be pursued. Similarly, his concept of the commonwealth
must likewise be examined in order to understand why the just war exists in the first
place. An understanding of Augustine’s dependence upon Cicero’s writings for the
framework of these three concepts will illuminate the extent of his dependence on
Cicero’s thought for the development of his Just War Theory.

6

Cicero’s Influence on Augustine
Augustine was the son of a wealthy family and, as such, received a proper Roman
education. Such an education in the late classical world included learning all the works
of Cicero. Augustine, as will be demonstrated, has a reputation for having a formidable
knowledge of the works of Cicero, and he repeatedly demonstrated his knowledge of
Cicero’s works in his own writings. It is important to realize the extent to which Cicero’s
writings had an effect on Augustine’s own writings, particularly those dealing with his
political theology, because only then can Augustine’s reliance on Cicero’s thought in
regards to his Just War Theory be fully understood.
The education Augustine received relied heavily on reading the works of a
handful of Roman authors, all of whom were pagan and predated the Christianization of
the Roman Empire. According to Peter Brown, “Vergil, Cicero, Sallust and Terence
were the only authors studied in detail.” 9 The writings of Cicero, particularly his
political writings, were widely read in the late classical period. 10 Cicero, due to his status
as one of the solitary figures whose writings were studied in depth, had a major influence
on Roman students in the late classical world.
It does not come as a surprise, then, that Augustine referred often to the writers
mentioned above. He singled out Cicero, though, for special consideration. Cicero, for

9

Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), 36.
George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (3rd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961),
161.

10
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example, is the only one of the above authors that Augustine mentioned as being an
ordinary part of his own education. He wrote, “And at that time during the regular course
of study I came across a certain book by Cicero.”11 Cicero was commonplace in Roman
education and, therefore, in Augustine’s academic training. The fact that Augustine was,
as a student, reading Cicero is, therefore, not noteworthy in any way. He read Cicero’s
writings during the usual course of his studies.
Augustine apparently learned Cicero’s writings quite well as a student. He has
been recognized both by his contemporaries and by modern researchers as someone who
knew a great deal of what Cicero wrote. His friend Alypius “boasted of his friend’s
prowess as an expert on Cicero to university circles in Carthage.” 12 A student,
Dioscorus, wrote to Augustine asking him to give his opinion on some parts of Cicero’s
writings. 13 The student Dioscorus wrote to Augustine for his opinion on Cicero’s
writings because of Augustine’s reputation as someone who knew Cicero well.
Augustine’s mastery of Cicero’s writings was, consequently, recognized during his own
time, and it is still being recognized by those who research Augustine’s life and writings.
Henri Marrou, for example, described Augustine as “un lettré antique, un disciple de
Cicéron.” 14 Augustine was in his own time and is at present known for his knowledge of
the writings of Cicero.
The best gauge, however, of Augustine’s knowledge of Cicero and of the
influence of Cicero’s writings on Augustine is found in Augustine’s own writings.
11

“et usitato jam discendi ordine perveneram in librum quemdam Ciceronis.” Augustine, Confessionum,
III.iv.7 (PL 32:13c).
12
Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 299.
13
Edward Frank Humphrey, Politics and Religion in the Days of Augustine (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1912), 156.
14
Henri Irénée Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (Paris: Éditions E. De Boccard, 1958),
543.

8

Augustine discussed in his writings the role Cicero played in his own life. Returning to
the passage from the Confessions quoted above, Augustine credited Cicero with inspiring
his conversion. He wrote,
And at that time during the regular course of study I came across a certain
book by Cicero, whose tongue all men admire, but not his heart. But that
book contains his exhortation to philosophy, and it is called Hortensius.
That very book changed my affections, and to you, Lord, it changed my
prayers, and it caused me to have other purposes and desires. (Augustine,
Confessionem, III.iv.7) 15
Augustine read Cicero’s Hortensius and was inspired to entirely change his life. He said
later in the Confessions, “By reading Cicero’s Hortensius, I was aroused to pursue
wisdom.” 16 The Hortensius did not immediately inspire Augustine to convert to
Christianity, but it did inspire him to pursue wisdom. This pursuit of wisdom eventually
led Augustine to Christianity, and Augustine recognized the Hortensius as the initial
catalyst he needed to start him on the road towards conversion. If it were not for Cicero,
perhaps there would be no St. Augustine!
As important as the Hortensius was to Augustine, Cicero’s De re publica has had
a much greater impact on his thought. He relied to varying extents on Cicero’s De re
publica in many of his own writings. According to George Sabine, “though the text of
the Republic was lost after the twelfth century and not recovered until the nineteenth

15

“et usitato jam discendi ordine perveneram in librum quemdam Ciceronis, cujus linguam fere omnes
mirantur, pectus non ita. Sed liber ille ipsius exhortationem continet ad philosophiam, et vocatur
Hortensius. Ille vero liber mutavit affectum meum, et ad teipsum, Domine, mutavit preces meas, et vota ac
desideria mea fecit alia.”
16
“lecto Ciceronis Hortensio, excitatos eram studio sapientiae.” Augustine, Confessionem, VIII.vii.17.
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century, its most striking passages had already been excerpted into the books of
Augustine and Lactantius.” 17 Augustine preserved a large portion of Cicero’s De re
publica in his own seminal work De civitate Dei, either by paraphrasing it or by quoting
it directly. Several key pieces of evidence of the connection between the elements of
Augustine’s Just War Theory and Cicero’s political philosophy involve quotations and
paraphrases of De re publica found in De civitate Dei. Significantly, the only fragment
of De re publica containing Cicero’s Theory of Just War is contained in De civitate Dei.
Augustine thought so highly of Cicero’s theory, and it had such a huge impact on his
thought, that he preserved it in what could arguably be considered his greatest work.
Other works by Augustine also contain paraphrases or quotes from De re publica.
Augustine paraphrased De re publica in his letters, such as in Epistula XCI . 18 In his
Epistula CXXXVIII, Augustine paraphrased and critiqued Cicero’s praise of Julius Caesar
and quoted Cicero’s description of the formation of a commonwealth from De re
publica. 19 Augustine quoted Cicero’s thought that men are born weak, physically, but
they possess a spark of divine reason, found in the third book of De re publica, in his
Contra Iulianum. 20 Consequently, because Augustine frequently referred to De re
publica and other writings of Cicero in his own writings, a significant portion of his
thought was dependent upon Cicero’s writings, particularly De re publica.
The most telling sign of the influence of Cicero’s thought on Augustine’s thought,
however, is De civitate Dei itself. Its structure roughly resembles that of De re publica.
The subject of the commonwealth in De re publica and the City of God in De civitate Dei
17

Sabine, 163.
Augustine, Epistula XCI, 3-4 (CSEL 34:427-435).
19
Augustine, Epistula CXXXVIII, 9 (CSEL 44:126-148).
20
Augustine, Contra Iulianum, IV.xii.60-61 (PL 44:10c).
18
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is introduced and the purpose of the work is explained in the first part of each work. 21
Cicero and Augustine each, then, proceeded to describe the history of the Roman political
state. 22 Augustine then diverged from the structure of De re publica into a Christian
apology that spans books VI through XVIII of De civitate Dei. He refuted the gods and
the philosophers, and then he described the sacred history of the heavenly and earthly
cities. 23 This is quite a noticeable divergence from De re publica, which with the
possible exception of questioning the philosophical ideas of particular philosophers such
as Plato and Aristotle, does not contain material of this nature. 24 Augustine returned to
Cicero’s form in the last four books of De civitate Dei. In both the last four books of
Augustine’s De civitate Dei and the last book of Cicero’s De re publica, the components
of the Just War Theory, justice, natural and temporal law, and the commonwealth are
detailed, and this is where each scholar explained their thoughts about just war. 25 The
last part of De re publica, commonly known as “Scipio’s Dream,” and the last three
books of De civitate Dei describe the afterlife. They each present a favorable afterlife for
the people who devote their lives to the service of the commonwealth and the City of
God, respectively. Augustine obviously did not copy the structure of De re publica
exactly, but he seems to have been inspired by it to the point that De civitate Dei bears
more than a passing resemblance to it.
Cicero’s De re publica deeply affected Augustine’s way of thinking and writing.
Augustine quoted and paraphrased it in his writings to the point that he helped preserve a

21

Cicero, De re publica, I; Augustine, De civitate Dei, I.
Cicero, De re publica, II; Augustine, De civitate Dei, II-V.
23
Augustine, De civitate Dei, VI-XVIII.
24
Cicero, De re publica, III.viii.
25
Cicero, De re publica, III; Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX.
22
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large portion of the text when it was lost. De re publica, therefore, is important for
understanding the relationship between Cicero’s political philosophy and Augustine’s
Just War Theory, because Cicero explains his ideas about justice, natural and temporal
law, the commonwealth, and just war in it. Augustine took these concepts from Cicero
and combined them with his Christian theology to form his Just War Theory.

12

Chapter 2
Justice
The foundational element of Augustine’s Just War Theory is the virtue of justice.
This is not a virtue that only impacts a person internally, as will be shown, but involves a
sense of civic justice, a virtue that impacts a person’s external environment. Augustine
based his concept of justice on the definition of justice as a civic virtue provided by
Cicero, which is one of the elementary ideas in Cicero’s political philosophy. Augustine
then altered Cicero’s definition of justice to fit his Christian religious beliefs, resulting in
a change of focus that affected every aspect of his political thought, particularly his Just
War Theory.
Justice, in Cicero’s thought, is service to others, performing one’s civic duty. It is
the external performance of virtue that gives each person what each is due. Cicero
described his concept of justice in De officiis. He wrote,
The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to another,
unless provoked by wrong; and the next is to lead men to use common
possessions for the common interests, private property for their own. . . .
But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for
ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our
friends a share; and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the earth
produces is created for man’s use; and as men, too, are born for the sake of
13

men, that they may be able mutually to help one another; in this direction
we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good
by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by
our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more
closely together, man to man. (Cicero, De officiis, I.vii) 26
Cicero defined justice as selflessness in the performance of one’s civic duties. Justice
seeks the wellbeing of others in order to promote the strength and stability of human
society. The only function Cicero assigned to justice is a social function.
Augustine also assigned justice a social function. His definition of justice is brief,
but it agrees with and was influenced by that of Cicero. Augustine presented his
definition of justice in the midst of a commentary on the commonwealth as presented by
Cicero in De re publica. Augustine wrote, “Furthermore justice is that virtue which gives
to each whatever is their due.” 27 This is not an inner virtue so much as it is a virtue that
is defined by its outward expression, the way it treats other human beings. Just as
Cicero’s definition of justice is primarily concerned with the fair treatment of other
people through the proper performance of one’s civic duties, Augustine’s definition of
justice is concerned with the treatment of other people, which he also applied to the
proper performance of civic duty.

26

“Sed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessitus iniuria, deinde ut communibus pro
communibus utatur, privates ut suis. . . . Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum
nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicate, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris
gignantur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se
aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium afferre
mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devineire hominum inter
homines societatem. ”
27
“Justitia porro ea virtus est, quae sua cuique distribuit.” Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX.xxi.
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It is helpful at this point to note that the concept of justice and the other
components of Augustine’s Just War Theory sometimes sound as though they might have
come from Aristotle, rather than from Cicero. This is not very likely, however, since
Cicero had more than a passing acquaintance with the philosophy of Aristotle. He
referred frequently to both Plato and Aristotle in the philosophical debate he presented in
De re publica, including a consideration of their philosophical views about justice. 28
Since Augustine’s thought was so heavily influenced by Cicero’s thought, and since
Augustine did not seem to have been very familiar with the works of Aristotle, it is most
likely that a possible resemblance between Augustine’s concept of justice and Aristotle’s
concept of justice was based on Cicero’s use of Aristotle and that Augustine’s concept of
justice was primarily influenced by Cicero’s concept of justice.
Both Cicero and Augustine used the word iustitia as their chosen word for justice
in their definitions. This was not an uncommon word for the virtue justice in Latin.
Augustine could easily have come upon it in the writings of another scholar, or he could
have come up with it completely on his own. The important thing about his use of
iustitia is where he used it. He discussed the nature of the commonwealth in Cicero’s De
re publica in Book XIX of De civitate Dei. One of the concepts Augustine addressed in
this passage is Cicero’s insistence on justice as the foundational element of the
commonwealth. Significantly, Augustine inserted his own definition of justice right into
the middle of this passage, indicating that he equated his own definition of justice with
Cicero’s definition of justice. Augustine did not just use the same word for justice as
Cicero. He acknowledged by its placement in this passage that he shared Cicero’s
28

Cicero, De re publica, III.viii.
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definition of justice. Augustine also made reference in this passage to another passage in
Book II of De civitate Dei in which he discussed Cicero’s ideas about the commonwealth
from De re publica, located in Book II of this same work. In the passage in Book II,
Augustine quoted De re publica several times, including one quote that shows Cicero’s
use of the word iustitia. Both he and Augustine used it in the same way, to identify it as a
civic virtue. This indicates that Augustine was not just using the same word as Cicero,
but that iustitia meant the same thing to Augustine as it does to Cicero.
Augustine, however, added another dimension to this concept of justice. He was
a Christian, and he had developed some very Christian ideas about the source of justice
and virtue in general. According to Marcia Colish, Augustine’s “endorsement of the idea
that moral acts are primarily intellectual acts. . . informs his assent to the Stoic principle
that virtue lies within, in the good conscience of the individual who possesses a correct
moral intention.” 29 Augustine agreed with the Stoics, including Cicero, about virtue
being internal to humans and coming from correct moral intentions, but he did not think
those correct moral intentions could be innate to humans. Humans are subjected to
Original Sin and are not capable of producing justice from within themselves. Augustine
wrote,
For it cannot give itself the justice which it has lost and no longer has,
because the man received it when he was made, and by sinning has
certainly lost it. He receives justice, therefore, and on account of it he
may merit to receive blessedness. Wherefore the Apostle truly says to him
who begins to boast as though it were from his own good: ‘For what has
29

Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, vol. 2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1985), 209.
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thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why doest
thou boast as though thou hast not received it?’ (I Cor 4:7) (Augustine, De
trinitate, XIV.xv.21 (PL 42:15c)) 30
Sin robbed humans of their original innate capacity for justice. Consequently, humans
are not capable of producing justice on their own. Justice and the other virtues must then
be given to humans by God. Only Christians, the true worshippers of God, are therefore
capable of exercising true justice. Augustine wrote,
For if these are true virtues – and such cannot exist save in those who have
true piety – they do not profess to be able to deliver the men who possess
them from all miseries; for true virtues tell no such lies, but they profess
that by the hope of the future world this life, which is miserably involved
in the many and great evils of this world, is happy as it is also safe.
(Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX.iv) 31
He also wrote, “For though the soul may seem to rule the body admirably, and the reason
the vices, if the soul and reason do not themselves obey God, as God has commanded
them to serve Him, they have no proper authority over the body and the vices.”32 The
main idea in these passages is that the only people who are capable of true virtue are
those who also have true piety, which for Augustine was Christian piety. This true virtue
30

“Justitiam quippe dare sibi non potest quam perditam non habet. Hanc enim, cum homo conderetur,
accepit; et peccando utique perdidit. Accipit ergo justitiam, propter quam beatitudinem accipere mereatur.
Unde veraciter ei dicitur ab Apostolo, quasi de suo bono superbire incipienti: Quid enim habes quod non
accepisti? Si autem accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis? (I Cor 4:7)”
31
“Si enim verae virtutes sunt, quae nisi in eis, quibus vera inest pietas, esse non possunt; non se profitentur
hoc posse ut nullas miserias patiantur homines, in quibus sunt: neque enim mendaces sunt verae virtutes, ut
hoc profiteantur; sed ut vita humana, quae tot et tantis hujus saeculi malis esse cogitur misera, spe futuri
saeculi sit beata, sicut et salva.”
32
“Quamlibet enim videatur animus corpori, et ratio vitiis laudabiliter imperare; si Deo animus et ratio ipsa
non servit, sicut sibi serviendum esse ipse Deus praecepit, nullo modo corpori vitiisque recte imperat.”
Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX.xxv.
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is also iustitia, indicating that it is the same concept of justice that he defined in accord
with Cicero’s definition of justice as a civic virtue. According to Augustine, only
Christians have the ability, though their submission to God’s commands, to receive and
thereby practice true virtue, including justice.
This contradicts Cicero’s thought about the origins of virtue. Cicero followed a
more classical line of thought when he declared that reason controlling the vices
produced virtue. Cicero wrote, “True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of
universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands,
and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions.” 33 Reason is the governor of one’s
actions. Reason suppresses vice and produces virtue and is innate in all humans. This is
the primary source of disagreement between Cicero’s definition of justice and
Augustine’s definition of justice.
Augustine did not, however, allow his Christianization of Cicero’s definition of
justice to cloud its original meaning as a civic virtue. Augustine instead recommended
that virtue be used in the function of maintaining the present social order, just like Cicero
asserted that justice be used to promote the bonds of society. Augustine advised
Maecdonius, a Christian Roman official, in a letter to use the virtue God gave him in
executing his secular duties. Augustine wrote, “If you recognize that you have received
the virtues which you have, and if you return thanks to Him from whom you have
received them, directing them to His service even in your secular office. . . then yours

33

“Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad
officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut vetat nec improbos
iubendo aut vetando movet.” Cicero, De re publica, III.xxii.
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will be true virtues.” 34 This passage illustrates that Augustine did not need to change
Cicero’s definition of justice in order to make it coalesce with his own Christian views
about the source of virtue. Justice, according to both Cicero and Augustine, is an external
product of internal virtue. The only change Augustine needed to make was to change the
source of internal virtue from human reason to God.
Justice, according to Cicero and Augustine, is a virtue that is expressed through
one’s treatment of others. When the commonwealth is wronged, both Cicero and
Augustine agreed that the party committing the wrong should be punished. This holds
true whether those committing the wrong are external or internal enemies of the
commonwealth. Thus a commonwealth that punishes the party committing the wrong is
acting out of justice when it declares Just War on the party.

34

“Si enim uirtutes, quas accepisti, a quo acceperis, sentiens eique gratias agens eas ad ipsius cultum etiam
in tuis istis saecularibus honoribus . . . uerae illae uirtutes erunt.” Augustine, Epistula CLV, 12 (CSEL
44:430-447).
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Natural and Temporal Law
According to both Cicero and Augustine, when the commonwealth is wronged,
justice demands that the party that has committed the wrong receive punishment. Those
actions, as will be shown, are determined to be just or unjust based on whether or not
they are allowed under the temporal law of the commonwealth, assuming the temporal
law is based on the law of nature. The temporal law also contains the just punishments
for unjust actions. Both Cicero and Augustine argued that temporal law should be based
on natural law in order to ensure that it is just. As with justice, Augustine took his
definition of natural law from Cicero then modified it with his Christian theology.
Cicero used Laelius, one participant in the philosophical debate that he set up in
De re publica, as his mouthpiece to explain his views regarding natural law. Part of this
explanation is contained in the preceding quote from Cicero about reason controlling the
vices and producing virtue. The entire passage reads,
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal
application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its
commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does
not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though
neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law,
nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to
abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or
20

people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or an
interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at
Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and
unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will
be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of
this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient
is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of
this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is
commonly considered punishment. (Cicero, De re publica, III.xxii) 35
Cicero mentioned several important characteristics of natural law in this passage. Natural
law is synonymous with reason. It applies to everyone; no one is exempt from it or its
ability to control the vices and produce virtue. Natural law is unchangeable, and it is
eternal. It can be, but should not be, abrogated by human temporal law. It requires no
interpreters. Natural law originated with God, but it is important to remember that Cicero
was not a Christian and could not have been referring to the Christian God, because he
died before Christianity came into existence. Except for God being its originator, there is
nothing surprising about Cicero’s definition of natural law.
It would be profitable to gain an understanding of the nature of the God to which
Cicero was referring. He wrote,
35

“Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae
vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut vetat nec
improbos iubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet
neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus, neque est
quaerendus explanator aut interpres eius alius, nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac,
sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit
communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus, ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non
parebit ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiamsi cetera supplica,
quae putantur, effugerit.”
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But as a matter of fact nothing exists that is superior to god; it follows
therefore that the world is ruled by him; therefore god is not obedient or
subject to any form of nature, and therefore he himself rules all nature. In
fact if we concede divine intelligence, we concede also divine providence,
and providence exercised in things of the highest moment. Are then the
gods ignorant what things are of the highest moment and how these are to
be directed and upheld, or do they lack the strength to undertake and to
perform duties so vast? But ignorance is foreign to the divine nature, and
weakness, with a consequent incapacity to perform one’s office, in no way
suits with the divine majesty. This proves our thesis that the world is
governed by divine providence. (Cicero, De natura deorum, II.xxx) 36
God was not the same as one or all of the gods to Cicero. Cicero referred to God in the
singular, whereas he referred to the gods of the pantheon in the plural. Cicero’s God was
not any one of the gods that he esteemed over the others, either, since Cicero physically
located God above the other gods in the order of nature. God existed above nature and
controlled nature, whereas the other gods, whose existence Cicero did acknowledge,
existed within nature and were part of it. Cicero’s God was transcendent, omniscient and
omnipotent. Cicero also wrote,
. . . so it would have been the proper course for the philosophers, if it so
happened that the first sight of the world perplexed them, afterwards when
36

“Nihil est autem praestantius deo; ab eo igitur mundum necesse est regi; nulli igitur est naturae oboediens
aut subiectus deus, omnem ergo regit ipse naturam. Etenim si concedimus intellegentes esse deos,
concedimus etiam providentes et rerum quidem maxumarum. Ergo utrum ignorant quae res maxumae sint
quoque eae modo tractandae et tuendae, an vim non habent qua tantas res sustineant et gerant? At et
ignoratio rerum aliena naturae deorum est et sustinendi muneris propter inbecillitatem difficultas minime
cadit in maiestatem deorum. Ex quo efficitur id quod volumes, deorum providential mundum
administrari.”
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they had seen its definite and regular motions, and all its phenomena
controlled by fixed system and unchanging uniformity, to infer the
presence not merely of an inhabitant of this celestial and divine abode, but
also of a ruler and governor, the architect as it were of this mighty and
monumental structure. (Cicero, De natura deorum, II.xxxv) 37
Here Cicero called God the creator and ruler of the universe. This is, by Cicero’s own
indications in De natura deorum, the Stoic definition of God. It is most definitely not the
Christian concept of God, as it is not a God that requires conversion of any sort or
attempts to maintain any kind of personal connection with each believer. Cicero’s God is
unconcerned with believers. The sole concern of Cicero’s God is maintaining the natural
order of the universe. Cicero’s concept of God differs greatly from Augustine’s concept
of God. Augustine was a Christian and believed in the traditional Christian God.
Augustine’s God, like Cicero’s God, is also the ruler of the universe, but unlike Cicero’s
God, He demands worship and a personal relationship with each person, as will be seen
later. Cicero’s God does not have this need.
Despite the differences in their concepts of God, Augustine’s concept of natural
law does not differ significantly from that of Cicero. In the Confessions, he wrote, “I did
not know that true interior justice, which judges not according to custom but by the most
righteous law of almighty God. By this law the customs of various regions and times
were adapted to times and places. But the law itself is everywhere and always the same;

37

“sic philosophi debuerunt, si forte eos primus aspectus mundi conturbaverat, postea, cum vidissent motus
eius finitos et aequabiles omniaque ratis ordinibus moderata inmutabilique constantia, intellegere inesse
aliquem non solum habitatorem in hac caelesti ac divina domo sed etiam rectorem et moderatorem et
tamquam architectum tanti operis tantique muneris.”
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it is never one thing in one place and different in another.” 38 Both Cicero and Augustine
were communicating the same concept in their descriptions of natural law. Augustine did
not use the same exact words for natural law as Cicero, but their terminology is
suspiciously close. Cicero called natural law vera lex, or true law, which he also called
recta ratio naturae congruens, or right reason in agreement with nature. This
combination of words is presented in one phrase, and it resembles Augustine’s term for
natural law. Augustine calls natural law lege rectissima, or righteous law. This seems to
be closely related to the terms Cicero used for true law and right reason, which are
presented in succession: vera lex recta ratio. Augustine and Cicero also used similar
terms for the characteristics of natural law. Cicero called it diffusa in omnia, which
literally means diffused throughout all, but it could also mean universal. Augustine used
a different term, ubique, to mean universal, but it has the same implication as Cicero’s
diffusa in omnia. Both terms indicate that natural law is not just present everywhere, but
that it is all-pervasive. Cicero also called natural law constans and sempiterna, or
unchanging and everlasting. Augustine combined both ideas into one term, ipsa. . .
semper, which literally means always itself or always the same thing. Cicero’s
sempiterna contains the same word as Augustine’s semper, and both terms include the
idea of the eternal and unchangeable character of natural law. Both authors emphasized
this with similar references to the fact that, according to their definitions, natural law is
no different in one place or time than it is in another place or time. Cicero said that
natural law is not alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, or one law in

38

“Et non noveram justitiam veram interiorem, non ex consuetudine judicantem, sed ex lege rectissima Dei
omnipotentis, qua formarentur mores regionum et dierum pro regionibus et diebus ; cum ipsa ubique ac
semper esset, non alibi alia, nec alias aliter.” Augustine, Confessionum, III.vii.13.
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Rome, another in Athens, one law now, and another law in the future. Augustine used
the same type of phrase when he said natural law is not alibi alia, nec alias aliter, one
thing in one place and another thing in another place. This seems to be a somewhat
condensed version of Cicero’s phrase. Cicero and Augustine did not use the exact same
terminology to describe natural law, but it seems as though Augustine based his
terminology on that of Cicero.
According to Augustine, the natural law, since it determines whether something is
just or unjust, is the law that was transgressed when humans committed the first sin.
Augustine wrote, “But by nature, as God first created us, no one is the slave either of man
or of sin. This servitude is, however, penal, and is appointed by that law which enjoins
the preservation of the natural order and forbids its disturbance; for if nothing had been
done in violation of that law, there would have been nothing to restrain by penal
servitude.” 39 Transgression of the natural law introduced sin into the world. Humans
transgressed the natural law when they tried to become like God, defying the natural
order. Natural law dictates that God is higher than humanity, and this cannot be changed.
The term Augustine used for natural law in this passage is ea lege ordinator, or the law
that orders or preserves order, and he described this law by calling it quae naturalem
ordinem conservari iubet, or that which commands the preservation of the natural order.
God is the author of the natural order, and defiance of the natural order is defiance
against God. Augustine included this idea in a letter to Hilarius in which he wrote, “But,
all the sinners of the earth become prevaricators by transgressing against the other law
39

“Nullus autem natura, in qua prius Deus hominem condidit, servus est hominis, aut peccati. Verum et
poenalis servitus ea lege ordinatur, quae naturalem ordinem conservari jubet, perturbari vetat: quia si contra
eam legem non esset factum, nihil esset poenali servitute coercendum.” Augustine, De civitate Dei,
XIX.xv.
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which is found in the faculty of reason of the rational soul in all who have attained the
age of reason.” 40 This relationship between the “other law” and reason reflects Cicero’s
definition of natural law as “right reason in agreement with nature,” which seems to
indicate a correlation between the two passages. This passage implies that the “other
law” is natural law. Natural law comes from God and determines whether or not
something is just. It communicates this justice to the human through the faculty of
reason. Augustine’s concept of natural law is very similar to Cicero’s concept of natural
law. It applies to everyone. It is unchangeable and eternal, and it requires no
interpreters. It also originated with God and is comprehended by the human through
reason.
Unlike Cicero, however, Augustine did not believe humans could discover natural
law on their own. According to Augustine, knowledge of the natural law comes from
divine illumination. Augustine wrote,
We ought rather to believe that the nature of the intellectual mind was so
made that, by being naturally subject to intelligible realities, according to
the arrangement of the creator, it sees these truths in a certain incorporeal
light of a unique kind, just as the eye of the body sees the things all around
it in this corporeal light. (Augustine, De trinitate, XII.xv.24) 41
In other words, the mind is only capable of comprehending realities that God reveals to it.
This concept is somewhat at variance with Cicero’s concept of God and His role with
40

“Lege autem alia praeuaricata, quae est in usu rationis animae rationalis in aetate hominis iam ratione
utentis, praeuaricatores fiunt omnes peccatores terrae.” Augustine, Epistula CLVII, 15 (CSEL 44:449-488).
41
“sed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus intelligibilibus
naturali ordine, disponente Conditore, subjuncta sic ista videat in quadam luce sui generis incorporea,
quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in hac corporea luce circumadjacent, cujus lucis capax eique
congruens est creatus.”
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respect to human comprehension of natural law. The philosophers mentioned above by
Cicero did not need divine illumination to figure out what the world was. They just
needed their own abilities to see, hear, and reason. Augustine, however, twisted Cicero’s
view of human capabilities to support his own theology of the necessity of divine
illumination in order to comprehend natural law. Augustine wrote,
The world’s sages affirm that philosophy contributes something to this –
that philosophy which, according to Cicero, the gods have bestowed in its
purity only on a few men. They have never given, he says, nor can ever
give, a greater gift to men. So that even those against whom we are
disputing have been compelled to acknowledge, in some fashion, that the
grace of God is necessary for the acquisition, not, indeed, of any
philosophy, but of the true philosophy. And if the true philosophy – this
sole support against the miseries of this life – has been given by Heaven
only to a few, it sufficiently appears from this that the human race has
been condemned to pay this penalty of wretchedness. And as, according
to their acknowledgment, no greater gift has been bestowed by God, so it
must be believed that it could be given only by that God whom they
themselves recognize as greater than all the gods they worship.
(Augustine, De civitate Dei, XXII.xxii) 42

42

“Ad quam rem etiam philosophiam prodesse dicunt docti hujus saeculi, quam dii quibusdam paucis, ait
Tullius, veram dederunt. Nec hominibus, inquit, ab his aut datum est donum majus, aut potuit ullum dari:
usque adeo et ipsi, contra quos agimus, quoquo modo compulsi sunt in habenda, non quacumque, sed vera
philosophia divinam gratiam confiteri. Porro si paucis divinitus datum est verae philosophiae contra
miserias hujus vitae unicum auxilium, satis et hinc apparet humanum genus ad luendas miseriarum poenas
esse damnatum. Sicut autem hoc, ut fatentur, nullum divinum majus est donum, sic a nullo deo dari
credendum est, nisi ab illo, quo et ipsi qui multos deos colunt, nullum dicunt esse majorem.”
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In this passage, Augustine took Cicero’s praise of the human intellect and used it to argue
against the classical position, and Cicero’s actual position, that humans can figure out the
universe by using their reason. Cicero held the belief that only a few people are capable
of using their reason to comprehend philosophy, and Augustine altered the meaning of
this statement to indicate that there are only a few people who will know the true
philosophy, which is God’s wisdom, that can only be gained through divine illumination.
While Cicero’s God did not need to provide divine illumination the way Augustine’s God
did, Augustine drew on Cicero’s Stoic concept of the transcendent God to change
Cicero’s argument to support the idea that true philosophy and the human reason through
which true philosophy can be comprehended are only given to the individual by God
through grace and divine illumination.
Both Cicero and Augustine viewed God as the engineer of the universe and of the
natural order. Cicero called God the architectum, or architect, and he called the universe
muneris, or a structure, in the passage from De natura deorum. Augustine referred to
God with the term Conditore, or founder, in this passage from De trinitate, which brings
to mind the traditional Roman phrase ab condite urbem, or from the founding of the city.
Use of this term by Augustine is most likely meant to reflect Cicero’s concept of God as
an architect, but implies that God did not just build a structure, but that He built an entire
city. God, according to both Cicero and Augustine, controls the universe and created the
natural law, to which all people are subjected. Only in this way, though, did Cicero
consider God to be the master of humanity, just as He is the master of the entire universe
and everything in it.
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Augustine and Cicero both acknowledged that God, whether or not it is the
Christian God, is the source of natural law. They even seem to have agreed that God
plays an active part in the administration of natural law and that obeying natural law
means submitting to God as master, even though they disagreed on what submission to
God meant for the individual. In the passage above, Cicero said, “But there will be one
law, eternal and unchangeable, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there will be, as
it were, one common master and ruler of men, namely God, who is the author of this law,
its interpreter, and its sponsor.” This is a surprising statement coming from a pagan, but
it does not seem to be the addition of an editor, since it matches the concept of God
presented by Cicero at length in De natura deorum. The last sentence of this passage,
though, gives the clue to Cicero’s perceived relationship between God and human.
Cicero wrote, “Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human
nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he
escapes what is commonly considered punishment.” According to Cicero a person
submits to God as his or her master by living according to natural law and practicing
virtue, which is “right reason in agreement with nature.” There is no personal
relationship involved. Augustine did not need to alter Cicero’s concept of natural law at
all because of this statement regarding God being the master of nature and the universe.
He just reinterpreted the statement. Augustine wrote,
And justice, whose office it is to render to every man his due, whereby
there is in man himself a certain just order of nature, so that the soul is
subjected to God, and the flesh to the soul, and consequently both soul and
flesh to God – does not this virtue demonstrate that it is as yet rather
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labouring towards its end than resting in its finished work? (Augustine,
De civitate Dei, XIX.iv) 43
Augustine agreed with Cicero that people must practice virtue in order to follow natural
law. This natural order makes people subject to God. Augustine, however, believed that
obeying natural law, rather than only having applications to human affairs on earth, will
advance a person toward their ultimate spiritual goal.
The above passage from Augustine indicates why natural law is important to the
study of his Just War Theory. In it, Augustine implied that justice comes from the order
of nature, or natural law. He stated the same idea more clearly in the passage above that
is taken from the Confessions, in which he said that true interior justice judges according
to God’s righteous law, natural law. This concurs with Cicero’s thought that virtue
comes from natural law. Both Cicero and Augustine thought that justice, along with the
other virtues, comes from natural law through reason, and both thought natural law
originated with God. Significantly, both Cicero and Augustine also thought that
obedience to the natural law means submission to God as master. Only Augustine,
however, meant that humans, after Original Sin, must receive justice and the
understanding of natural law from God. Cicero did not mention the need for divine
illumination or divine grace in regard to any aspect of his political philosophy.
The connection between natural law and justice reinforces the connection between
God and justice, explaining that humans receive justice from God by allowing themselves
to be guided by natural law through the use of their reason, although Augustine also

43

“Quid justitia, cujus munus est sua cuique tribuere (unde fit in ipso homine quidam justus ordo naturae,
ut anima subdatur Deo et animae caro, ac per hoc Deo et anima et caro), nonne demonstrat in eo se adhuc
opere laborare potius, quam in hujus operis jam fine requiescere?”
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emphasized the role of divine illumination in this process. Understanding the connection
between justice and natural law also builds the connection between justice and what
Augustine called temporal law, or laws created by humans. According to both Cicero
and Augustine, temporal law is not natural law. It should be based on natural law and
should reflect natural law, but the two are not synonymous. Marcia Colish said Cicero
“translates the Stoic idea of natural law as an ethical and cosmic principle into a legal
principle to be used as the norm of the legitimacy of the civil law of a given historical
community.” 44 Cicero, consequently, used the connection between virtue and natural law
as a basis for specific laws for use in a specific time and place. Cicero wrote,
For then the man who rules others is not himself a slave to any passion,
but has already acquired for himself all those qualities to which he is
training and summoning his fellows. Such a man imposes no laws upon
the people that he does not obey himself, but puts his own life before his
fellow-citizens as their law. (Cicero, De re publica, I.xxxiv) 45
The ruler Cicero mentioned is the ideal ruler who governs his life according to the natural
law and is, therefore, a virtuous person. That does not mean that the laws he makes for
his citizens are equal to the natural law. The laws made by this ruler reflect the natural
law and encourage the practice of virtue among his fellow-citizens. The ruler’s citizens
must obey the temporal law this ruler has made, but he also provides them, through the
way he lives his own life, with an example of how to follow the natural law themselves
and to govern their lives according to virtue, as he has. The difference between the
44

Colish, vol. 1, 96.
“Virtute vero gubernante rem publicam quid potest esse praeclarius, cum is, qui inperat aliis, servit ipse
nulli cupiditati, cum, quas ad res civis instituit et vocat, eas omnis complexus est ipse nec leges inponit
populo, quibus ipse non pareat, sed suam vitam ut legem praefert suis civibus?”
45
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ruler’s life and the law he makes illustrates the relationship between natural law and
temporal human law. Cicero argued that temporal law could and should be based on
natural law, but human law is not the equivalent of natural law.
Augustine also thought that temporal law should be based on, but was not equal
to, natural law. He wrote, “There is nothing just or legitimate in temporal law save what
men have derived from the eternal law.” 46 Its validity as a law, consequently, would be
judged by whether or not it is based on natural law. A just temporal law could only be a
temporal law that is derived from the natural law. Augustine also wrote, “I did not know
that true interior justice, which judges not according to custom but by the most righteous
law of almighty God. By this law the customs of various regions and times were adapted
to times and places. But the law itself is everywhere and always the same; it is never one
thing in one place and different in another.” 47 Temporal laws vary according to different
times and places, but natural law is always the same in every time and place. Some
temporal laws are closer to natural law, making them more valid, and some temporal laws
are further from natural law, making them less valid.
Cicero and Augustine did not describe the relationship between natural and
temporal law using the same words, nor did they use the same conventions to do so.
They did, however, still convey the same meaning and intention. In Cicero’s passage, the
just ruler only makes laws that he himself is willing to follow. The word justice is not
used to describe these laws, but Cicero made the assumption that the just man would only

46

“Simul etiam te videre arbitror in illa temporali nihil esse justum atque legitimum, quod non ex hac
aeterna sibi homines derivarint.” Augustine, De libero arbitrio, I.vi.15 (PL 32:3c).
47
“Et non noveram justitiam veram interiorem, non ex consuetudine judicantem, sed ex lege rectissima Dei
omnipotentis, qua formarentur mores regionum et dierum pro regionibus et diebus; cum ipsa ubique ac
semper esset, non alibi alia, nec alias aliter.” Augustine, Confessionum, III.vii.13.
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be willing to follow, and therefore to make, just laws. The just ruler bases those just laws
on his own virtue, which comes from his own adherence to natural law. He, therefore,
only makes just temporal laws, which are laws that conform to the natural law.
Augustine stated his case for the reliance of just temporal laws on natural law a bit more
clearly and succinctly than Cicero when he said, “There is nothing just or legitimate in
temporal law save what men have derived from the eternal law.” He left very little room
for interpretation in this passage. Temporal laws can only be just if they are based on the
natural law.
Natural law determines what justice is. Temporal laws, then, are just if they are
based on natural law as much as possible. They provide the context for wrongdoing
against the commonwealth in that temporal law declares actions just or unjust based on
their compliance with natural law and, therefore, justice. Temporal laws also prescribe
just punishments for wrongdoing. One possible form of punishment that can be used
against either an external or internal aggressor is the just war. An understanding of
justice and temporal law is crucial for understanding the commonwealth, the third
element in Augustine’s Just War Theory.
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Commonwealth
The next step in understanding the development of Augustine’s Just War Theory
is to understand the commonwealth. As conceived by Augustine and Cicero, their idea of
the commonwealth builds on the concepts of justice and temporal law that have already
been developed. This is a crucial step in understanding Augustine’s Just War Theory,
and as with the concepts of justice, natural law, and temporal law, Augustine took his
concept of the commonwealth from Cicero’s concept of the commonwealth and modified
it with his Christian theology.
Cicero’s concept of the commonwealth is dependent upon his definitions of
justice and temporal law. Cicero puts his definition of a commonwealth into the mouth
of Scipio, another participant in the debate presented in De re publica. Cicero wrote,
Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of the people. But a people is
not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way,
but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement
with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. The first
cause of such an association is not so much the weakness of the individual
as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man. For man is
not a solitary or unsocial creature, but born with such a nature that not
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even under conditions of great prosperity of every sort [is he willing to be
isolated from his fellow men.] (Cicero, De re publica, I.xxv) 48
Cicero used the term multitudinis iuris to indicate that this passage is referring to a group
of just people. These just people form a commonwealth by forming a coetus consensus et
utilitatis communione sociatus, or “an agreement with respect to. . . a partnership for the
common good.” Cicero implied in this statement that law is an essential part of a
commonwealth, and that its citizens come to an agreement about a law promoting justice
and a partnership for the common good. Cicero also indicated that justice is necessary to
the formation of the commonwealth in another passage, but he said it in a negative
fashion. Cicero wrote, “What the musicians call harmony in song is concord in a State,
the strongest and best bond of permanent union in any commonwealth; and such concord
can never be brought about without the aid of justice.” 49 Augustine also paraphrased
Cicero’s description of a commonwealth in De civitate Dei, which indicates the
importance he ascribed to Cicero’s concept of the commonwealth. Augustine wrote,
“Then, at the request of the company, Laelius attempted to defend justice, and strained
every nerve to prove that nothing is so hurtful to a state as injustice; and that without
justice a republic can neither be governed, nor even continue to exist.” 50 Laelius is, as
mentioned before, a participant in the debate in Cicero’s De re publica, and the other
48

“Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus
quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensus et utilitatis communione sociatus. Eius
autem prima causa coëundi est non tam inbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregation;
non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc, sed ita generatum, ut ne in omnium quidem rerum
adfluentibus copiis.”
49
“et quae harmonia a musicis dicitur in cantu, ea est in civitate concordia, artissimum atque optimum
omni in re publica vinculum incolumitatis, eaque sine iustitia nullo pacto esse potest.” Cicero, De re
publica, II.xlii.
50
“Tum Laelius rogantibus omnibus, justitiam defendere aggressus est; asseruitque quantum potuit, nihil
tam inimicum quam injustitiam civitati, nec omnino nisi magna justitia geri aut stare posse rempublicam.”
Augustine, De civitate Dei, II.xxi.
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participants in the debate have given him the task of defending justice as it relates to the
commonwealth. Augustine has condensed Laelius’ argument into a few brief words that
get at the heart of Cicero’s argument in favor of justice in the commonwealth. This
statement and the preceding passage from De re publica make it clear that Cicero thought
that the commonwealth could not exist apart from justice. The two characteristics of a
commonwealth, therefore, are people agreeing to live under a temporal law and to treat
each other with justice.
Augustine agreed with Cicero’s two requirements for the formation of a
commonwealth, justice and temporal law. Augustine wrote in a letter to Marcellinus,
“And what is the state but the generality of men united by the bond of common
agreement? In their authors we read: ‘In a short time a scattered and wandering mob
became a state by mutual agreement.’” 51 This passage mentions the necessity of
common agreement among the citizens of the commonwealth. It implies through its
reference to the founding of the Roman state that the common agreement is about
agreeing to live under a particular temporal law. The quote from “their authors”
Augustine used in this passage comes from Cicero’s De re publica, which shows that
Augustine took this part of the definition of the commonwealth from Cicero. Augustine
mentioned the necessity of temporal law in a commonwealth in De libero arbitrio. He
wrote, “A people is composed of men associated under one law, a temporal law.” 52 The
word Augustine used in this passage for people is populus. This is a word that is closely
related to the words Cicero used to describe a commonwealth or a republic. In the
51

“Quid est autem ciuitas nisi hominum multitude in quoddam uinculum redacta concordiae? Apud eos
enim legitur ita: ‘Breui multitude diuersa atque uaga Concordia ciuitas facta erat.’” Augustine, Epistula
CXXXVIII, 10.
52
“nam ex hominibus una lege sociatis, populus constat.” Augustine, De libero arbitrio, I.vii.16.
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definition of a commonwealth given at the beginning of this chapter, Cicero said, Est
igitur. . . res publica res populi, or a republic is, therefore, a commonwealth (literally the
affairs of the people). He went on to define a populus by assigning it the characteristics
of a commonwealth. Cicero used the Latin words for people and republic in a very
similar manner, and that is what Augustine did in this passage from De libero arbitrio. In
this case, a people is the same thing as a commonwealth, and it is united under a common
temporal law. Augustine also indicated the necessity of justice in the formation of a
commonwealth in a negative fashion, just as Cicero did. He wrote, “Justice being taken
away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies?” 53 Here Augustine used the word
regna to indicate that this kingdom is a political affiliation, but this kingdom exits
without justice and, therefore, cannot be classified as a commonwealth. A true
commonwealth requires justice to exist. Augustine thought, as did Cicero, that a
commonwealth is made up of just people who agree to live under a common temporal
law.
Augustine, however, altered the concepts of justice and natural law to fit his
Christian theology, as has already been seen. Augustine’s Christianization of Cicero’s
concepts of justice and natural law led to his Christianization of Cicero’s concept of the
commonwealth. He wrote,
For, in the midst of that filth of depraved morals, and of an ancient
decadent learning, it was eminently right for a heavenly authority to come
and to bring relief by counseling voluntary poverty, chastity, kindness,
justice, concord, true filial love, and those other virtues which are the light
53

“Remota itaque justitia, quid sunt regna, nisi magna latrocinia?” Augustine, De civitate Dei, IV.iv.
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and strength of life, not only to make us lead this life with the utmost
regard for honor, nor only for the sake of making the society of the earthly
city as united as possible, but also that we may attain salvation and reach
that heavenly and divine country, whose peoples are immortal. Faith,
hope, and charity enroll us as citizens in that country, but, as long as we
voyage far from it, we are to bear with those – if we cannot bring about
their amendment – who hold that without punishing vice that state can
survive, that state which the first Romans founded and increased by their
virtues. (Augustine, Epistula CXXXVIII, 17) 54
Augustine implied in this passage that one of the purposes of the commonwealth is to
punish vice and curb the sinful tendencies inherent in people after the Fall. He based this
on his doctrine of Original Sin. As mentioned before, Augustine thought no human could
produce virtue without God giving him or her the ability to produce virtue. Humans
could only produce vice. According to Augustine, God has given humanity political
systems in order to curb their tendencies toward vice and sin. Augustine wrote, “But
because God does not wholly desert those whom He condemns, nor shuts up in His anger
His tender mercies, the human race is restrained by law and instruction, which keep guard
against the ignorance that besets us, and oppose the assaults of vice, but are themselves
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“In ista enim conluuie morum pessimorum et ueteris perditae disciplinae maxime uenire ac subuenire
debuit caelestis auctoritas, quae uoluntariam paupertatem, quae continentiam, beniuolentiam, uistitam atque
concordiam ueramque pietatem persuaderet ceterasque uitae luminosas ualidasque uirtutes non tantum
propter istam uitam honestissime gerendam nec tantum propter ciuitatis terrenae concordissimam
societatem uerum etiam propter adipiscendam sempiternam salutem et sempiterni quiusdam populi
caelestem diuinamque rem publicam, cui nos adsciscit fides, spes, caritas, ut, quam diu inde peregrinamur,
feramus eos, si corrigere non ualemus, qui uitiis inpunitis uolunt stare rem publicam, quam primi Romani
constituerunt auxeruntque uirtutibus.”
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full of labour and sorrow.” 55 Augustine used the words divina gubernatione in this
passage to indicate that its subject is government directed by God. This government
restricts the human tendency to commit vice, or sin, through the use of laws and
punishments. According to Augustine, the function of the commonwealth, therefore, is to
curb sin in order to promote its objective, which is salvation and eternal life.
The above passage from Epistula CXXXVIII is loaded with Augustine’s views
about the commonwealth. In it, he stated that virtue came from God, rather than from
humans, when He determined it was time to give virtue to humanity. One of the
functions of these God-given virtues that Augustine listed is to make the commonwealth
as unified as possible. Augustine seems to have implied that a commonwealth might be
possible to a certain extent without involving God or Christianity, but it could never
realize its full potential. Only Christians, who have received virtue from God, can unify
the commonwealth to the ultimate extent. Only Christians have received divine
illumination regarding the natural law, so only they can create temporal laws that best
approximate imitation of the natural law. Christians practice true virtue and unite under a
temporal law based on the natural law established by God to form the best
commonwealth it is possible to achieve while still on earth.
It may be useful at this point to explain that Augustine frequently applied his
political theology regarding the commonwealth to the Roman political state of his day.
He did so in the above passage from Epistula CXXXVIII, and he also did so in Epistula
CLV. Both of these are letters written to Roman political officials who were also
55

“Sed divina gubernatione non omni modo deserente damnatos, et Deo non continente in ira sua
miserationes suas, in ipsis sensibus generis humani prohibitio et eruditio contra istas, cum quibus nascimur,
tenebras vigilant, et contra hos impetus opponuntur, plenae tamen etiam ipsae laborum et dolorum.”
Augustine, De civitate Dei, XXII.xxii.
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Christians. In them, Augustine encouraged each of them to apply his political theology
of the commonwealth to the duties required by their political positions. Augustine,
however, seems to have been aware of the problem of applying his political theology to
the Roman Empire. He never claimed that the Roman Empire was a perfect
commonwealth. He wrote,
But accepting the more feasible definitions of a republic, I grant there was
a republic of a certain kind, and certainly much better administered by the
more ancient Romans than by their modern representatives. But the fact
is, true justice has no existence save in that republic whose founder and
ruler is Christ, if at least any choose to call this a republic; and indeed we
cannot deny that it is the people’s weal. (Augustine, De civitate Dei,
II.xxi) 56
Augustine admitted in this passage that the only commonwealth based on true justice is
the City of God, but he hesitated in this assertion, which is seen in his choice of phrases:
si et ipsam rempublicam placet dicere, or if it pleases anyone to call it a commonwealth.
Perhaps in this passage he was conceding the point that the City of God is not a
commonwealth according to the definition he himself gives, since the City of God was
created by God, not by the agreement of its citizens. The Roman Empire, on the other
hand, was a commonwealth for exactly that reason. Rome was founded by just people
agreeing to live under a temporal law, which Augustine grudgingly admitted in the above
passage. Augustine never equated Rome with either the City of God or the city of earth.
56

“Secundum probabiliores autem definitiones, pro suo modo quodam respublica fuit: et melius ab
antiquioribus Romanis, quam a posterioribus administrata est. Vera autem justitia non est, nisi in ea
republica, cujus conditor rectorque Christus est; si et ipsam rempublicam placet dicere, quoniam eam rem
populi esse negare non possumus.”
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Rome was an altogether separate entity where the citizens of the City of God and the city
of earth were both present. Whether or not Rome was a commonwealth according to
theory, Augustine treated its governance as though it was the government of a
commonwealth, and this became the testing ground for his Just War Theory.
Both Cicero and Augustine, therefore, agreed on the elements necessary to make a
commonwealth. A commonwealth is made up of people agreeing to live according to
justice under one common temporal law. Augustine qualified these elements by
declaring that only Christians practice true justice and can make temporal laws based on
the natural law, therefore the Christian commonwealth is the best and most strongly
unified commonwealth possible. Augustine’s Christianization was a substantial
departure from Cicero’s definition of a commonwealth. This Christianization, however,
led to a much larger separation between their concepts of a commonwealth. Cicero and
Augustine disagreed about the purpose of the commonwealth.
Cicero, as would be expected, took the classical philosophical view of the purpose
of the commonwealth. George Sabine sums up the purpose of Cicero’s commonwealth:
“The state, then, is a corporate body, membership in which is the common possession of
all its citizens; it exists to supply its members with the advantages of mutual aid and just
government.” 57 This is reflected in Cicero’s definition of a commonwealth. Since
humans are compelled by nature to live in social groups, then it is reasonable to assume
that the purpose of the commonwealth is to provide the safest and most advantageous
social group possible for its citizens. According to Cicero, this is the goal of the
commonwealth.
57

Sabine, 166.
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Augustine conceded that a commonwealth should provide its citizens with
“justice and a partnership for the common good.” These things are, however, the means
to an end rather than the end itself. Augustine wrote, “But as the word peace is employed
in connection with things in this world in which certainly life eternal has no place, we
[Christians] have preferred to call the end or supreme good of this city life eternal rather
than peace.” 58 Peace is not the ultimate goal of the commonwealth. Eternal life is the
ultimate goal of the commonwealth. Augustine also wrote, “It will be easier for a society
whose peace is based on piety and justice to take thought for the conquered.” 59 Peace in
this passage is a beneficial state for the commonwealth, because then the Christians in the
commonwealth can tend to the spiritual well-being of, in most cases convert or reform,
those who have been forcibly enrolled in the commonwealth. This passage also implies
that a peace based on piety will restrict vice and promote justice. As stated earlier,
Augustine thought humans have a great need to be restrained by the government of the
commonwealth. The ultimate goal of the commonwealth, therefore, is to correct sinful
human tendencies and to make sure that all people have the correct religious beliefs,
thereby ensuring their future well-being in the afterlife.
This change in the purpose of the commonwealth is a major break between the
thought of Cicero and the thought of Augustine. Augustine used Cicero’s definition of a
commonwealth as his own definition in order to delineate the commonwealth from a
kingdom without justice, but he gave it an otherworldly purpose, whereas Cicero gave his
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“Sed quoniam pacis nomen etiam in his rebus mortalibus frequentatur, ubi utique non est vita aeterna;
propterea finem civitatis hujus, ubi erit summum bonum ejus, aeternam vitam maluimus commemorare
quam pacem.” Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX.xi.
59
“Ad pietatis iustitiaeque pacatam societatem uictis facilius consulatur.” Augustine, Epistula CXXXVIII,
14.
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commonwealth an earthly purpose. It was necessary for Augustine to give the
commonwealth this spiritual purpose if it was to be accepted as something in which a
Christian could participate. This spiritual purpose will also play a big part in Augustine’s
Just War Theory by justifying religious coercion on the part of the commonwealth.
Cicero and Augustine may not have agreed on the purpose of the commonwealth,
but they agreed in their characterization of it. In attempting to explain the function of the
commonwealth, they both related the commonwealth to the family. This was an easy
association to make, since the commonwealth and the family are both social institutions.
Both Cicero and Augustine considered the commonwealth to be the family on a large
scale.
Cicero considered the commonwealth to be part of the natural order of the
universe. He asserted that the commonwealth was created by the human tendency to seek
out and join with other humans. Immediately following his definition of a
commonwealth, he wrote, “The first cause of such an association is not so much the
weakness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man.
For man is not a solitary or unsocial creature, but born with such a nature that not even
under conditions of great prosperity of every sort [is he willing to be isolated from his
fellow men.]” 60 The same social nature that produces the commonwealth also produces
the family. The family and the commonwealth are part of the same hierarchy of the
social and natural order. Cicero wrote that without the commonwealth “existence is
impossible for a household, a city, a nation, the whole human race, nature and the
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“Eius autem prima causa coëundi est non tam inbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi
congregation; non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc, sed ita generatum, ut ne in omnium quidem
rerum adfluentibus copiis.” Cicero, De re publica, I.xxv.
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universe itself.” 61 In this passage, the commonwealth is higher than the family in the
hierarchy, implying that the commonwealth is a larger version of the family. The
commonwealth, like the family, is a natural product of human social behavior.
Augustine referred to this same hierarchy of social groups when he compared the
commonwealth to the family. He wrote,
Since, then the house ought to be the beginning or element of the city, and
every beginning bears reference to some end of its own kind, and every
element to the integrity of the whole of which it is an element, it follows
plainly enough that domestic peace has a relation to civic peace – in other
words, that the well-ordered concord of domestic obedience and domestic
rule has a relation to the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and civic
rule. And therefore it follows, further, that the father of the family ought
to frame his domestic rule in accordance with the law of the city, so that
the household may be in harmony with the civic order. (Augustine, De
civitate Dei, XIX.xvi) 62
Augustine made a clear reference to the correlation between the family and the city,
which he uses interchangeably with the commonwealth. He reinforced this comparison
with his word choices in this passage. He connected pax domestica, or the peace of the
household, with pacem civicam, or civic peace. The word civicam is an adjective
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“Sine quo nec domus ulla nec civitas nec gens nec hominum universum genus stare nec rerum natura
omnis nec ipse mundus potest.” Cicero, De legibus, III.i.
62
“Quia igitur hominis domus initium sive particula debet esse civitatis, omne autem initium ad aliquem
sui generis finem, et omnis pars ad universi, cujus pars est, integritatem refertur: satis apparet esse
consequens, ut ad pacem civicam pax domestica referatur, id est, ut ordinata imperandi obediendique
concordia cohabitantium referatur ad ordinatam imperandi obediendique concordiam civium. Ita fit, ut ex
lege civitatis praecepta sumere patremfamilias oporteat, quibus domum suam sic regat, ut sit paci
accommodata civitatis.”
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describing this peace as being the peace of the civitate, which can be translated in several
ways. It can mean city, as it is translated in this passage, or it can mean state, as it is
translated in Cicero’s definition of the commonwealth. 63 It is more accurate in the above
passage to translate civitate as state, since Augustine related it to other terms that were
frequently applied by both him and Cicero to the commonwealth. For example,
Augustine applied the word concordia to the cohabitantium, or the members of the
household, and to the civis, or the citizens of a commonwealth. The word concordia is
found frequently throughout both Cicero’s and Augustine’s writings about the
commonwealth. Augustine also included in this passage references to the lege civitatis,
or the law of the state, and the paci civitatis, or the peace of the state. Law and peace, as
have been seen, are common themes in Augustine’s theory of the commonwealth. The
above passage, therefore, is not comparing the family to the city. It is comparing the
family to the commonwealth.
Another way Augustine related the commonwealth to the family was by
frequently juxtaposing the concepts of family and city without making a direct
connection between the two, but relating them both to the same idea. For instance, he
wrote,
But the families which do not live by faith seek their peace in the earthly
advantages of this life; while the families which live by faith look for
those eternal blessings which are promised, and use as pilgrims such
advantages of time and of earth as do not fascinate and divert them from
God, but rather aid them to endure with greater ease, and to keep down the
63

Cicero, De re publica, II.xlii.
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number of those burdens of the corruptible body which weigh upon the
soul. (Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX.xvii) 64
Following this is a statement about what the earthly and heavenly cities seek. Augustine
wrote,
The earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and
the end it proposes, in the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and
rule, is the combination of men’s wills to attain the things which are
helpful to this life. The heavenly city, or rather the part of it which
sojourns on earth and lives by faith, makes use of this peace only because
it must, until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away.
(Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX.xvii) 65
The commonwealth and the family are two social associations that share many
characteristics and perform many of the same functions, as can be seen in these passages.
Both the family in the first passage and the city, actually a civitas, which could be a state,
in the second passage require pacem terrenam, or earthly peace. The earthly family and
city seek earthly peace as their ends, but the family and city who live by faith utilize
earthly peace during their time on this earth before they reach heaven. The word to
describe both the heavenly family and the heavenly city while they are on earth is
peregrinatur, which means pilgrimage. They are both on pilgrimage while they are on
64

“Sed domus hominum qui non vivunt ex fide, pacem terrenam ex hujus temporalis vitae rebus
commodisque sectatur. Domus autem hominum ex fide viventium, exspectat ea quae in futurum aeterna
promissa sunt, terrenisque rebus ac temporalibus tanquam peregrina utitur, non quibus capiatur et avertatur
quo tendit in Deum, sed quibus sustentetur ad facilius toleranda minimeque augenda onera corporis
corruptibilis, quod aggravat animam.”
65
“Ita etiam terrena civitas, quae non vivit ex fide, terrenam pacem appetit; in eoque defigit imperandi
obediendique concordiam civium, ut sit eis de rebus ad mortalem vitam pertinentibus humanarum quaedam
compositio voluntatum. Civitas autem coelestis, vel potius pars ejus, quae in hac mortalitate peregrinatur, et
vivit ex fide, etiam ista pace necesse est utatur, donec ipsa cui talis pax necessaria est, mortalitas transeat.”
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earth. The use of these terms and the proximity of these passages in De civitate Dei
indicate that Augustine meant for there to be a connection between the two ideas.
Augustine often compared the family to the commonwealth in this manner. He also
implied a comparison between the family and the commonwealth when he described how
a just man interacts with his family. He wrote,
This is the origin of domestic peace, or the well-ordered concord of those
in the family who rule and those who obey. For they who care for the rest
rule – the husband the wife, the parents the children, the masters the
servants; and they who are cared for obey – the women their husbands, the
children their parents, the servants their masters. But in the family of the
just man who lives by faith and is as yet a pilgrim journeying on to the
celestial city, even those who rule serve those whom they seem to
command; for they rule not from a love of power, but from a sense of the
duty they owe to others – not because they are proud of authority, but
because they love mercy. (Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX.xiv) 66
The role of the just man’s family members is to treat each other with justice, whether
they are in positions of authority or subservience, and the outcome of such behavior will
be concord within the family. Here again Augustine used several terms to imply the
connection between this description of a family and his definition of a commonwealth.
He used the terms pax domestica, or domestic peace, concordia cohabitantium, or
66

“Hinc itaque etiam pax domestica oritur, id est, ordinata imperandi obediendique concordia
cohabitantium. Imperant enim qui consulunt: sicut vir uxori, parentes filiis, domini servis. Obediunt autem
quibus consulitur: sicut mulieres maritis, filii parentibus, servi dominis. Sed in domo justi viventis ex fide,
et adhuc ab illa coelesti civitate peregrinantis, etiam qui imperant, serviunt eis, quibus videntur imperare.
Neque enim dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio consulendi; nec principandi superbia, sed
providendi misericordia.”
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concord of the household, and domo justi, or the home of the just man, to imply a
connection to the same words used time and again in his descriptions of the
commonwealth. Justice is treated in this passage as a civic virtue that is employed by the
family members in order to produce concord within the family, just as justice is used in
relation to the commonwealth to produce concord in the commonwealth.
The concept of the commonwealth and the family being similar social institutions
and performing many of the same functions gave Augustine the ability to create an
interesting change in Cicero’s Just War Theory, which will be seen later. Augustine, at
this point asserted that the Christian commonwealth is the best commonwealth that
human beings are capable of producing. This is because of the divine guidance of
Christians. They receive justice and knowledge of the natural law from God through
divine illumination, and they are able to make temporal law conform more to the natural
law than their pagan counterparts. Thus, the Christian commonwealth is best in a
position to create peace and concord, which in turn serve to allow the members of the
commonwealth to tend to the spiritual welfare of all within the commonwealth. One way
the Christian commonwealth attains peace and concord is by waging Just War.
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Chapter 3
Just War
Cicero and Augustine both combined these various elements, justice, natural and
temporal law, and the commonwealth, into their Just War Theories. Augustine based his
Just War Theory on Cicero’s Just War Theory, utilizing many of the same concepts and
expressions as Cicero. He did not, however, agree with Cicero’s more humanistic view
of the purpose of the commonwealth. Augustine gave the commonwealth and,
consequently, his Just War Theory a spiritual purpose.
As mentioned earlier, Augustine included Cicero’s Just War Theory in De civitate
Dei. Augustine wrote,
I am aware that Cicero, in the third book of his De republica, if I mistake
not, argues that a first-rate power will not engage in war except either for
honour or for safety. What he has to say about the question of safety, and
what he means by safety, he explains in another place, saying, ‘Private
persons frequently evade, by a speedy death, destitution, exile, bonds, the
scourge, and the other pains which event the most insensible feel. But to
states, death, which seems to emancipate individuals from all
punishments, is itself a punishment; for a state should be so constituted as
to be eternal. And thus death is not natural to a republic as to a man, to
whom death is not only necessary, but often even desirable. But when a
49

state is destroyed, obliterated, annihilated, it is as if (to compare great
things with small) this whole world perished and collapsed. (Augustine,
De civitate Dei, XXII.vi) 67
Augustine preserved Cicero’s Just War Theory in this passage. He considered it
important enough to his political theology and to his own Just War Theory to include it in
De civitate Dei. Cicero declared that a Just War could be waged by the commonwealth
in order for the commonwealth to fulfill its purpose of preserving peace and the mutual
advantage enjoyed by its citizens. The word used for honor in this passage is fide, which
has a wide variety of meanings. It could mean honor, but it could also mean a promise of
protection. The commonwealth could wage just war in defense of its honor. It could also
wage war in order to protect its citizens from the wrongdoing of another party, which
could be part of the mutual advantage they enjoy as citizens in the commonwealth. This
meant that it was waging war in order to punish the other party for committing a
wrongdoing against the commonwealth. That is what Augustine meant by justice giving
each his due. In addition to protecting its citizens, the commonwealth could wage war in
order to protect itself from destruction. The word used for safety is salute, but it would
probably be better translated as preservation. The commonwealth could also wage just
war in order to preserve its existence. It could only preserve justice and mutual
advantage for its citizens if it was still in existence, and therefore, preserving the
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“Scio in libro Ciceronis tertio, nisi fallor, de Republica, disputari, nullum bellum suscipi a civitate
optima, nisi aut pro fide, aut pro salute. Quid autem dicat pro salute, vel intelligi quam salutem velit, alio
loco demonstrans, Sed his poenis, inquit, quas etiam stultissimi sentiunt, egestate, exsilio, vinculis,
verberibus, elabuntur saepe privati, oblata mortis celeritate. Civitatibus autem mors ipsa poena est, quae
videtur a poena singulos vindicare. Debet enim constituta sic esse civitas, ut aeterna sit. Itaque nullus
interitus est reipublicae naturalis, ut hominis, in quo mors non modo necessaria est, verum etiam optanda
persaepe. Civitas autem cum tollitur, deletur, exstinguitur: simile est quodammodo (ut parva magnis
conferamus) ac si omnis hic mondus intereat et concidat.’”
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commonwealth was imperative. The commonwealth requires the ability to wage just war
in order to survive and fulfill its purpose as a commonwealth.
Augustine reflected Cicero’s definition of Just War in his own writings.
Augustine wrote,
For peace is not sought in order that war may be aroused, but war is waged
in order that peace may be obtained. . . . Yet, if human peace is so sweet
for procuring the temporal salvation of men, how much sweeter is peace
with God for procuring the eternal salvation of the angels! So let it be
your necessity and not your choice that slays the enemy who is fighting
against you. (Augustine, Epistula CLXXXIX, 6) 68
This passage does not specifically mention the term just war, but it does address the
concept of just war. Augustine said in it that the purpose of war is to secure peace as a
means to promote the temporal welfare of the citizens of the commonwealth, which
echoes Cicero’s concept of a just war, since the spiritual welfare of the citizens of the
commonwealth relies on their temporal welfare and on the existence of the
commonwealth. Augustine wrote,
But, say they, the wise man will wage just wars. As if he would not all the
rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man;
for if they were not just he would not wage them, and would therefore be
delivered from all wars. For it is the wrong-doing of the opposing party
which compels the wise man to wage just wars; and this wrong-doing,
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“Non enim pax quaeritur, ut bellum excitetur, sed bellum geritur, ut pax adquiratur. . . . Si autem pax
humana tam dulcis est pro temporali salute mortalium, quanto est dulcior pax divina pro aeterna salute
angelorum! Itaque hostem pugnantem necessitas perimat, non voluntas.”
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even though it gave rise to no war, would still be matter of grief to man
because it is man’s wrong-doing. Let every one, then, who thinks with
pain on all these great evils, so horrible, so ruthless, acknowledge that this
is misery. (Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX.vii) 69
Augustine, however, never gave a completely coherent definition of a just war in his
writings. He left it to the historian to piece his Just War Theory together.
Augustine’s Just War Theory begins with justice. Justice, according to Cicero, is
a civic virtue whose main purpose is to ensure that everyone in the commonwealth
receives fair and honest treatment. Augustine combined this concept of justice with the
concept of divine grace and illumination. No human can be just without God giving him
or her the ability to practice justice. Christians receive justice and the other virtues from
God, and it is the duty of the Christian to ensure that others are able to practice true virtue
through conversion and, if necessary, compulsion. Like Cicero, Augustine considered
political leaders to be in a position that enabled them to use their positions to compel
others to live according to virtue, which Augustine interpreted to mean coming to a right
belief. He wrote,
If you recognize that you have received the virtues which you have, and if
you return thanks to Him from whom you have received them, directing
them to His service even in your secular office; if you rouse the men
subject to your authority and lead them to worship God, both by the
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“Sed sapiens, inquiunt, justa bella gesturus est. Quasi non, si se hominem meminit, multo magis dolebit
justorum necessitatem sibi exstitisse bellorum; quia nisi justa essent, ei gerenda non essent, ac per hoc
sapienti nulla bella essent. Iniquitas enim partis adversae justa bella ingerit gerenda sapienti: quae iniquitas
utique homini est dolenda, quia hominum est, etsi nulla ex ea bellandi necessitas nasceretur. Haec itaque
mala tam magna, tam horrenda, tam saeva, quisquis cum dolore considerat, miseriam fateatur.”
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example of your own devout life and by your zeal for their welfare,
whether you rule them by love or by fear; if, in working for their greater
security, you have no other aim than that they should thus attain to Him
who will be their happiness – then yours will be true virtues, then they will
be increased by the help of Him whose bounty lavished them on you, and
they will be so perfected as to lead you without fail to that truly happy life
which is no other than eternal life. (Augustine, Epistula CLV, 12) 70
This passage is from a letter to Macedonius, a Christian Roman public official, and in it
Augustine is advising Macedonius to use his political position to compel others to accept
Christianity. Interestingly, this is reminiscent of Cicero’s description of the function of
the just man who is a ruler, who compels others to live virtuous lives by imposing on his
fellow-citizens the laws that he obeys and by giving them an example of the kind of life
they ought to lead by leading one himself. Augustine seems to be taking a cue from
Cicero that compulsion is necessary to produce virtue in some people.
Augustine also seems to have found consent for coercion in Cicero’s application
of temporal law in the commonwealth. Cicero wrote,
Therefore the citizen who compels all men, by the authority of magistrates
and the penalties imposed by law, to follow rules of whose validity
philosophers find it hard to convince even a few by their admonitions,
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“Si enim uirtutes, quas accepisti, a quo acceperis, sentiens eique gratias agens eas ad ipsius cultum etiam
in tuis istis saecularibus honoribus conferas tuaeque potestati subditos homines ad eum colendum et
exemplo religiosae tuae uitae et ipso studio consulendi seu fouendo seu terrendo erigas et adducas nihilque
qliud in eo, quod per te securius uiuunt, uelis, nisi ut hinc illum promereantur, apud quem beate uiuent, et
uerae illae uirtutes erunt et illius opitulatione, cuius largitate donatae sunt, ita crescent et perficientur, ut te
ad uitam uere beatam, quae non nisi aeterna est.”
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must be considered superior even to the teachers who enunciate these
principles. (Cicero, De re publica, I.ii) 71
When the ruler of the commonwealth makes laws, they are just, due to his understanding
of virtue and natural law, and the citizens of the commonwealth agree to live under these
laws. The commonwealth would not exist without such laws. There is also a glimpse in
this passage of the division Cicero made between people. There are those who are
capable of being persuaded to act according to virtue, and there are those who are
incapable of acting according to virtue on their own with no external persuasion. Those
who are incapable of voluntarily living according to virtue can be compelled, through the
authority of the political leaders and the punishments prescribed by the just laws of the
commonwealth, to live according to virtue.
Augustine adjusted this concept of those who are capable of acting according to
virtue and those who are not capable of acting according to virtue to fit the religious
situation of his time. According to Augustine, there are those who are made capable by
God of being persuaded to follow orthodox Christianity, and there are those who need to
be compelled to accept orthodox Christianity. There had already been edicts issued by
Rome’s Christian emperors, mentioned above, punishing those who did not conform to
orthodox Christianity. As seen before, Augustine acknowledged that Rome was not a
true commonwealth, but Augustine used Rome as the subject against which he applied
his political theories. 72 The edicts of the Christian emperors could easily mesh with
Cicero’s concept of the just laws of the commonwealth in Augustine’s thought. The
71

“Ergo ille civis, qui id cogit omnis imperio legumque poena, quod vix paucis persuadere oratione
philosophi possunt, etiam his, qui illa disputant, ipsis est praeferendus doctoribus.”
72
James E. Holton, “Marcus Tullius Cicero,” in History of Political Philosophy (ed. Leo Strauss and
Joseph Cropsey; Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963) 145; Augustine, De civitate Dei, II.xxi.
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emperors were, with the exception of Julian the Apostate, Christians and, therefore, had
been given the ability by God to be just and to fulfill the duties of the leader of the
commonwealth, including the right and obligation to compel sinners and heretics to
follow orthodox Christianity.
The compulsion of sinners to accept orthodox Christianity came naturally out of
Augustine’s modified purpose of the commonwealth. Contrary to the purpose of
Cicero’s commonwealth, the purpose of Augustine’s commonwealth is to promote the
spiritual wellbeing of its citizens. This spiritual wellbeing can only happen in a
commonwealth that has achieved temporal peace, so Augustine agreed with Cicero that
the commonwealth should be able to go to war to protect its citizens and to protect itself
from extinction. Extinction can happen in two possible ways. An external aggressor can
destroy the commonwealth through military assault, or an internal aggressor can destroy
the commonwealth by refusing to live according to justice. As mentioned before, a
commonwealth cannot exist without justice. The danger in a citizen who refuses to live
according to justice comes from their influence on others. The unjust citizen could
convince his fellow citizens to live unjust lives, and the commonwealth could become
infected, as it were, with a disease that could ultimately kill it. Augustine saw those who
did not adhere to orthodox Christianity in this light.
Augustine once again drew on Cicero to explain his attitude toward the internal
enemies of the commonwealth. He wrote,
It is on this account that the words of Cicero so move the heart of every
one, and provoke a sigh: “There are no snares more dangerous than those
which lurk under the guise of duty or the name of relationship. For the
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man who is your declared foe you can easily baffle by precaution; but this
hidden, intestine, and domestic danger not merely exists, but overwhelms
you before you can foresee and examine it.’” (Augustine, De civitate Dei,
XIX.5) 73
Internal enemies, according to both Cicero and Augustine, are the most difficult to
discover and address before they bring harm to the commonwealth. These internal
enemies, therefore, must be dealt with proactively. They should be persuaded, if at all
possible, to live according to justice. If they cannot be persuaded, then they should be
compelled to live according to justice, which is the proper Christian faith according to
Augustine.
Augustine also picked up on Cicero’s reference to domestic enemies and
interpreted it to mean enemies within the house as well as enemies within the
commonwealth. These enemies must have their rebellious tendencies suppressed in order
to ensure the peace of the commonwealth. Augustine wrote,
In his own home, too, he makes it his aim to be at peace with his wife and
children, and any other members of his household; for unquestionably
their prompt obedience to his every look is a source of pleasure to him.
And if this be not rendered, he is angry, he chides and punishes; and even
by this storm he secures the calm peace of his own home, as occasion
demands. For he sees that peace cannot be maintained unless all the
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“Propter quod omnium pectora sic attingit, ut cogat in gemitum, quod ait Tullius: Nullae sunt occultiores
insidiae, quam hae quae latent in simulatione officii, aut in aliquo necessitudinis nomine. Nam eum qui
palam est adversarius, facile cavendo vitare possis: hoc vero occultum, intestinum ac domesticum malum
non solum existit , verum etiam opprimit, antequam prospicere atque explorare potueris.”; cf. Cicero, In
verram, II.i.15.
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members of the same domestic circle be subject to one head, such as he
himself is in his own house. . . . And thus all men desire to have peace
with their own circle whom they wish to govern as suits themselves. For
even those whom they make war against they wish to make their own, and
impose on them the laws of their own peace. (Augustine, De civitate Dei
XIX.12) 74
In this passage, the household of this man is made peaceful by his use of anger and force,
creating a concord among the members of his family. Augustine also translated the peace
of this household into the peace of the commonwealth. Both the commonwealth and the
family head wage war in order to maintain peace. Augustine related this same sentiment
regarding war to the commonwealth in his letter to Boniface. He wrote, “You ought to
have peace as the object of your choice and war only as the result of necessity, so that
God may deliver you from the necessity and preserve you in peace; for peace is not
sought in order that war may be aroused, but war is waged in order that peace may be
obtained.” 75 These two passages use very similar terms to describe the relationship
between war and peace. Peace, in both passages, is pax. It is combined with the verbs
cupere, or to desire, in the first passage and volare, or to want, in the second passage.
These verbs are used similarly to indicate that peace is the object of desire. This peace is
gained by going to war. Both passages contain the phrase bellum gerere, which means to
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“In domo autem sua cum uxore et cum filiis, et si quos alios illic habet, studet profecto esse pacatus: eis
quippe ad nutum obtemperantibus sine dubio delectatur, Nam si non fiat, indignatur, corripit, vindicat: et
domus suae pacem, si ita necesse sit, etiam saeviendo componit. . . Pacem itaque cum suis omnes habere
cupiunt, quos ad suum arbitrium volunt vivere. Nam et cum quibus bellum gerunt, suos facere, si possint,
volunt, eisque subjectis leges suae pacis imponere.”
75
“Pacem habere debet voluntas, bellum necessitas, ut liberet deus a necessitate et conservet in pace. Non
enim pax quaeritur, ut bellum excitetur, sed bellum geritur, ut pax adquiratur.” Augustine, Epistula
CLXXXIX, 6.
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wage war. The second passage, however, clearly states the relationship between war and
peace with the phrase sed bellum geritur, ut pax adquiratur, “but war is waged in order
that peace may be obtained.” Interestingly, while the reference to an enemy in the
commonwealth is not specified as to whether it is internal or external, the enemy in the
family seems to be a member of the household, an internal enemy. The relationship
between these two passages signifies that Augustine felt that it was permissible to make
war on internal enemies.
Augustine, as mentioned before, equated the commonwealth with the family.
Since domestic enemies are family members, or fellow citizens in the case of the
commonwealth, they are not to be treated with hatred but with love and concern for their
welfare. Augustine wrote,
But we often have to act with a sort of kindly harshness, when we are
trying to make unwilling souls yield, because we have to consider their
welfare rather than their inclination, and this sort of thing has been
lavishly praised in their literature describing the beginnings of the state.
For, in punishing a son, however harshly, a father’s love is certainly not
cast aside, yet what he does not want, and what makes him suffer, happens
because it appears that he can be cured only by unwilling suffering. Thus,
if the earthly state observes those Christian teachings, even war will not be
waged without kindness, and it will be easier for a society whose peace is
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based on piety and justice to take thought for the conquered. (Augustine,
Epistula CXXXVIII, 14) 76
This passage presents Augustine’s complete argument for religious coercion, which is an
indispensable part of his Just War Theory. Here he took Cicero’s concepts of the
commonwealth and just war and turned them into the justification for the commonwealth
to enforce one particular religion, and one particular type of that religion, on its citizens.
On the surface, this is not very different from Cicero’s assertion that the duty of the
leaders of the commonwealth was to compel those who could not live by justice to do so.
Cicero’s assertion is, however, an injunction that applies to social justice only. Social
justice only mattered to Augustine, however, as it applied to promoting the temporal
welfare of the commonwealth, enabling its leaders to better care for the spiritual
wellbeing of its citizens.
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“Agenda sunt autem multa etiam cum inuitis benigna quadam asperitate plectendis, quorum potius
utilitati consulendum est quam uoluntati, quod in principe ciuitatis luculentissime illorum litterae
laudauerunt. Nam in corripiendo filio quamlibet aspere numquam profecto amor paternus amittitur; fit
tame, quod nolit et doleat, qui etiam inuitus uidetur dolore sanandus. Ac per hoc si terrena ista res publica
praecepta Christian custodiat, et ipsa bella sine beniuolentia non gerentur, ut ad pietatis iustitiaque pacatam
societatem uictis facilius consulatur.”
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
This study of the impact of the political writings of Cicero on Augustine’s
formulation of his Just War Theory has pointed out that Augustine often borrowed from
Cicero many of the basic concepts, definitions, and terms that he employed in his Just
War Theory. Although he usually added to these elements a decidedly Christian
orientation, he did so while retaining the basic structure provided by Cicero. Augustine
seems to have been reluctant to change the structure of each element. He was, after all,
the product of a classical, albeit late classical, education, and he showed a great deal of
respect for Cicero and his philosophical thought. Consequently, each of these elements,
justice, natural and temporal law, the commonwealth and the just war, retains a
considerable degree of its classical form, but Augustine changed the meaning to suit his
Christian theology.
The virtue justice is the primary element involved in the formulation of the
theory. Justice is defined by both Cicero and Augustine as a civic virtue that requires a
person both to live in such a manner that he seeks the good of others and to compel others
to live the same way, sometimes through the use of just war. Augustine defined justice
the same way Cicero did, but he added the idea that humans are impacted by Original Sin
and can only practice justice if they have received the ability to practice justice from God
through their belief in Him.
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Natural law is defined by Cicero and Augustine as the law that governs the natural
order. Both Cicero and Augustine asserted that God was the author of the natural law,
but only Augustine added the requirement that humans must receive divine illumination,
which God gives freely and cannot be compelled to do so, in order to perceive and
comprehend the natural law. The natural law is the basis for the formulation of the
temporal law of the commonwealth, according to both Cicero and Augustine. The
temporal law was written by the just ruler of the commonwealth for the purposes of
encouraging the citizens of the commonwealth to exercise justice, and it includes
punishments, such as just war, for those who are unwilling to exercise justice in order to
compel them to do so. Cicero argued for the exercise of justice for its own sake, but
Augustine argued that the exercise of justice is an act of faith, so exercising justice
became the equivalent of adhering to orthodox Christianity.
Cicero’s definition of a commonwealth is based on his concepts of justice and
temporal law: a commonwealth is a group of people who agree to live by justice under a
common temporal law. Augustine agreed with this definition of a commonwealth but
gave it Christian characteristics based on his Christianization of the concepts of justice
and temporal law. Cicero and Augustine also agreed that the commonwealth is entitled
to protect itself from those who would end its existence, either external enemies attacking
it from the outside or internal enemies attacking it from the inside by refusing to live
according to justice and the temporal law of the commonwealth, and they both considered
such protection to be a just cause to declare war, making the war a just war. Cicero
considered the internal threat to be those who would not live according to justice, but
Augustine changed this according to his Christian perspective to equate those who would
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not live according to justice with those who would not adhere to orthodox Christianity.
The commonwealth must prevent its own destruction if it is to survive and fulfill its
purpose. The purpose of the commonwealth, according to Cicero, is to maintain peace
and concord. Augustine conceded that peace and concord are necessary elements in the
commonwealth, but they are not its purpose. The purpose of the commonwealth,
according to Augustine, is to maintain peace and concord in order to promote the spiritual
welfare of its citizens, which includes compelling them, by just war if necessary, to
adhere to orthodox Christianity. Both Cicero and Augustine also related the
commonwealth to a family, since they both are natural human social organizations, in
order to explain the function of the commonwealth. Augustine, in particular, related the
commonwealth’s punishment of those who do not exercise justice by adhering to
orthodox Christianity to a father punishing his son in order to correct his son out of love
for him. Augustine, therefore, relied heavily on Cicero for the framework of his Just War
Theory, but he adjusted it to conform to his Christian outlook through his focus upon the
need for divine grace and divine illumination.
This study illuminates the need for a reexamination of Augustine’s works in light
of his strong ties to the classical world. Past and recent scholarship, in general, has by
either error or oversight failed to discover the true origins of Augustine’s Just War
Theory and to discuss it in detail. Only by a careful and detailed examination and
comparison of Cicero’s and Augustine’s writings can those origins be uncovered.
Augustine was perhaps more classical in outlook than previously assumed, rather than
merely being “medieval” in his outlook with regards to his Just War Theory. He is
indeed a transitional figure in history, but he had deep roots in the classical past. His tie
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to the classical past is so firm that he takes the existent classical framework of Cicero’s
Just War Theory and adds his Christian outlook to it. It is not new or original on
Augustine’s part, which leads to the question of what other aspects of Augustine’s
thought remain unexplored or are not sufficiently explained. There is, perhaps, a need to
reexamine all of Augustine’s writings in general with regard to his classical borrowings
and ties.
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